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Analyses of security practices at borders have focused on the dematerialisation 
(Amoore 2006; Salter 2006) and de-territorialisation (Balibar 2003; McNevin 2014; 
Walters 2006) of control of individuals’ mobility. This paper explores the nature of the 
control the state still exercises over individuals’ mobility at national borders. It focuses 
on a border that is supposed to have been opened, between France and Italy, inside the 
Schengen Area. It is based on analysis of the practices, representations and organisation 
of French border police officers, beginning with the legal and organisational 
transformations due to implementation of the Schengen Convention at the France-Italy 
border. It then turns to the study of border police officers’ targeting practices, using 
Heyman’s notion of a “plausible story”. Finally, it assesses the influence of deportation 
practices on the territoriality of the control of individuals’ mobility, as well as its effects 
on targeting practices. These borders are at the core of the interaction between the 
construction of a new, European political centre, and the affirmation of an older one, the 
national, political centre. This paper demonstrates that border police officers are in charge 
of dealing with the tension, a double bind of sorts, emerging from this interaction. 
National, internal borders are still a site in which the state manages individuals’ mobility.  
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Introduction 
Individual’s mobility control has long been considered as one of the main form of 
the exercise of sovereignty. In recent years, scholars have explored the link between the 
authority of the state and the power it exercises over its territory—specifically, over the 
latter’s limits—and whether state authority over the edges of its territory has been 
increasing or decreasing. Some scholars question the relevance of national borders 
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Sassen 1996) and of the state’s exclusive authority to 
define a jurisdiction and its limits (Sassen 2013). For example, for some authors, the use 
of geographical limits of national territory as a “stage” (Andreas 2001), or the tightening 
of border controls in general, is a clear sign of loss of state sovereignty (Bosworth 2008; 
Brown 2010). On the other hand, analyses of security practices at borders have focused 
on the extension or multiplication of areas in which checks and surveillance are 
conducted, and thus exercise of State power, beyond and inside the limits of national 
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territory. Because of the dematerialisation (Amoore 2006; Salter 2006) and de-
territorialisation (Balibar 2003; McNevin 2014; Walters 2006) of control of individuals’ 
mobility, we would be witnessing a gradual denial of national borders’ role as 
gatekeepers of national territory and as the “ultimate pillar of statehood” (Chalfin 2007, 
p.1625).  
This reflexion around the link between sovereignty and control of individual’s 
mobility is particularly striking in the case of the internal borders of the Schengen area. 
The Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 allows nationals of member states to move 
freely throughout the Schengen Area. The Schengen Convention, adopted in 1990, 
extends this right to citizens of other states who have a residence permit in one of the 
Schengen member states. The implementation of this convention led to the dismantling of 
ports of entry and the end of systematic border checks within the Area. We could 
conclude that these internal borders have lost their mobility regulation function and 
consequently the member states a part of their sovereign power. If the external borders of 
the European territory have been widely studied, with a specific focus on the analysis of 
the kind of sovereign power exercised (national or European) only a few studies were 
devoted to the internal borders (Groenendijk, Guild, & Minderhoud, 2002).  
This article analyses the tension between freedom of movement on European 
territory and national immigration control policies exercised at geographical borders. 
Indeed, since the mid-1970s decision to end labour immigration, national borders have 
been defined as the legitimate locus of control of individuals’ mobility. This article 
explores the nature of the control the state still exercises over individuals’ mobility at 
national borders: that between France and Italy, inside the Schengen Area.  
The materiality and territorially-embedded nature of the control of individuals’ 
mobility at these edges of the French territory will be investigated. What kind of 
consequences has the lifting of internal borders inside the Schengen Area had on this 
exercise of state power at the edges of national territory? This study is based on the 
analysis of practices, organization and representations among police officers at this 
specific kind of national geographical borders. 
Based both on archives from the French border police (1945-1992) and on 
interviews and observation of the daily tasks of the Police Aux Frontières (PAF), the 
French border police, it will pay specific attention to the organisational evolutions of this 
police department throughout the years and to the condition of exercise of their activity. 
Focusing on the controls operated at the France-Italy border, I will examine how tensions 
are expressed in the border police’ work. The implementation of the principle of free 
movement of people through national borders between two member states of the 
Schengen Area is a perfect example of a double bind for border police officers. 
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In the first section I will analyse legal and organisational changes due to 
implementation of the Schengen Convention at the France-Italy border. I will then turn to 
the study of border police officers’ targeting practices, using Heyman’s notion of a 
“plausible story”. Finally, I will assess the influence of deportation practices on the 
territoriality of control of individuals’ mobility, and their effects on targeting practices.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Studies of security practices at borders have highlighted the increasingly “mobile 
and fluid character of borders. Contemporary border control is [then described as] less 
about state personnel guarding a materialized line in the ground and more about the 
deployment of an expansive policing and surveillance apparatus that reaches beyond 
physical borderlines.” (Loftus 2013, p.3) In this literature, two elements are usually 
pointed out: the decreasing materiality and territoriality of borders.  
The notion of territoriality is used to describe the embedded nature of borders 
within geographical territory. It is often mistaken for the materiality of border controls. 
Many factors contributing to the de-territorialisation of borders have been identified. The 
lifting of borders inside the Schengen Area is widely recognised as a major change in 
border definition. Michel Foucher (1998, p.237-38) sees the creation of the Schengen 
Area as the end of territorial borders. Analysing European visa policies, Elspeth Guild 
(2002, p.103) shows that building the Schengen Area led to the “de-linking [of borders] 
from territory”; borders apply to individuals “not on the basis of their physical position 
but on the basis of their nationality and individual characteristics.” The general idea is 
that any location can become a locus of identity checks. Studying the effects of the 
implementation of the Schengen Convention, Kees Groenendijk (2002) shows that 
national government actors took advantage of the adoption of compensatory measures 
included in the Schengen Convention, to strengthen control over citizens and non-
citizens. Groenendjik emphasises the transfer of controls away from geographical borders 
toward national territory. His study is largely based on the study of legal transformations 
due to the Schengen Convention. Other scholars have focused their analysis on the 
shifting of checks and examinations inside national territory, away from national 
boundaries. The theme of remote controls has been widely studied (Boswell 2003, 
Guiraudon 2002a, Lavenex 2006), as well as the various technologies used along external 
EU borders, before migrants reach EU territory. Visa policies are part of this 
externalisation of border control (Guild 2002, Infantino 2010), as are carrier sanctions 
(Guiraudon 2002).   
A lot of the observation and analysis produced by this literature describe the recent 
evolution of border control and surveillance very accurately. However, these studies tend 
to give an “ahistorical” (Heyman 2004) image of an immutable, material and linear 
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“wall-border” corresponding to the geographical, territorial limits of the nation-state. Yet 
control of individuals’ mobility is an entire part of state activity and is exercised in 
numerous ways and venues. In order to avoid “an approach framed solely in terms of 
securitization theory, which often implies presentism by a lack of attention to the space/ 
time structuration that rendered possible an event”(Bigo 2014, p.211) I will study the 
border police officers’ organisation and practices at the France-Italy border before and 
after the Schengen Agreement’s implementation. Based on the analysis of archive 
documents produced by the French border police administration, this article will assess 
the evolution of the materiality of controls at the France-Italy border. Following in that 
respect an important literature (Torpey, 2000; Noiriel, 2001, 2007; Walters, 2006; Weber 
& Bowling, 2008), I interrogate the forms of continuity and discontinuity concerning the 
way the state regulates individual’s mobility.  
Furthermore, very few studies have analysed actual, practical controls that are still 
being conducted at internal borders (Darley 2008; Schwell 2010). I am interested here in 
the materiality of borders, that is, in the concrete practices and organisation of the 
services in charge of controlling individuals’ mobility at the limits of national territory. 
The literature on policing borders has focused on  the “dual role” (Heyman 2004, p.304) 
of policing actors, who have contradictory objectives: to facilitate the crossing of borders 
by those described by Katja Franco Aas (2011) as “bona fide travellers”, and at the same 
time, to target and stop “crimmigrants”. This tension has been studied through analysis of 
the targeting practices, determination of the origin of discriminatory practices amongst 
police officers, and identification of the ways in which these criteria are defined and 
diffused among the profession (Chan 2011; Pratt and Thompson 2008; Quinton 2011). 
This literature emphasises the “race” criterion as playing a central role in estimation of 
the risk associated with an individual (Pratt and Thompson 2008; Heyman 2001, 2004). 
But there is a consensus in the literature on the fact that even though race is widely used, 
it does not suffice to determine which individuals to target (Darley 2008; Chalfin 2007; 
Pratt and Thompson 2008; Heyman 2004, 2001). The notion of a “plausible story,” 
defined by Heyman, is particularly useful in the context of internal borders. It allows us 
to grasp a multiplicity of criteria and to give an account of the narrative dimension of the 
representations used by officers checking people crossing the border. This notion is a 
good way to describe police officers’ ability to elaborate and transmit this kind of 
professional and field-grounded representations. 
 
Methodological note  
Scholars have argued in recent years (Loftus 2013; Côté-Boucher et al. 2014) for a 
“practice turn” in border studies, “that emphasizes how actors act and how they give 
meaning to their actions” (Côté-Boucher et al. 2014, p.197). Besides, in the study of 
administrative actors there is a long-standing tradition of giving particular attention to 
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street-level civil servant practices and representations, in order to comprehend the 
discretion these actors enjoy (Lipsky 2010) when implementing public policies. From the 
same perspective, public policy studies have shown the significance of analysing the 
implementation phase in order to better acknowledge the reality of state regulations 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1984).  In contrast to the approach of these scholars of policy 
implementation, instead of looking at the gaps between a rule and its enforcement, this 
paper will analyse the ways in which these civil servants deal with conflicting orders. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the techniques and formalised representation used 
by border police officers in order to implement the rule of free movement of people 
within European territory in a context of restrictive national immigration policies.  
Analysis of the targeting practices “require[s] direct attention to the work routine 
and organizational culture of port officers.” (Heyman 2004, p.306) The methodological 
approach of this paper can be defined as “ethnographic sensibility as an epistemological 
commitment” (Côté-Boucher et al. 2014, p.204). It relies on the gathering of information 
about both the materiality and the symbolic aspect of the controls, thanks to interviews 
and observation of border police officers’ concrete tasks.. The empirical elements of this 
paper are part of my PhD fieldwork.  The data I have used here have been collected 
through interviews with street-level and chief PAF officers from the local offices of Nice 
and Menton (20 interviews), near the France-Italy border, and analysis of Interior 
Ministry archives. However, this analysis is also informed by the intermediate nature of 
my fieldwork in general, between interviews and observation, since I gained a particular 
form of access to the field. Due to my former political commitments, I did not approach 
PAF at the central level, so as to avoid denial of access. Thanks to academic connections, 
I reached a superintendent-director of the PAF for the Alpes-Maritimes département1. 
After an initial interview in October 2008, he gave me access to all the units under his 
authority: at the airport, along the French-Italian border at Menton, and inside the 
services specialised in criminal networks linked to migration. The fieldwork took the 
form of two one-week stays, in November 2008 and in March 2009. The interviews were 
scheduled directly with the superintendent, and I was accompanied from one unit to 
another by police officers: thus, other police officers perceived me as a "trainee". This 
ambiguity of my status proved helpful, allowing me to observe certain practices and hold 
informal conversations with various police officers for several hours. The limited total 
duration of my investigations was somewhat offset by these extensive periods of 
observation. 
The nature of the interviews and the fact that they were not recorded, accentuated 
this ambiguity. My main questions were focused on the PAF’s daily tasks and 
                                                
1 A département is a local administrative division of France. There are 101 in total, including those 
of mainland France and its overseas territories. 
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organisation of its work, and on the representations associated with them. I also asked 
police officers who had already been working before the lifting of internal borders within 
the Schengen Area, how they experienced this transformation. However, I did not 
systematically observe the practices of police officers, so the data I gathered are more 
centred on actors’ discourses about their daily work. Moreover the material condition of 
the framework didn’t allow me to conduct an in-depth ethnographical investigation.   
The specificity of this study is to cross empirical data on practices and historical 
data which relates to the legal and organisational framework of the PAF’s intervention. I 
consulted a range of archive documents dated from 1945 to 1992, from two 
administrations: the PAF itself and the Direction des Libertés Publiques et des Affaires 
Juridiques (DLPAJ), a branch of the Interior Ministry in charge of the development and 
enforcement of regulations concerning entry and residence of foreigners in France. This 
enabled me to develop a long-term analysis of the border police, and to obtain 
information about the relationship between the police and the authorities in charge of 
elaborating public policies. Finally, this look at the contemporary period allows me to 
emphasise the permanence of certain practices, ten years after the actual opening of 
borders in this region2. 
 
1. Evolution of the legal and organisational framework of PAF intervention at the 
France-Italy border 
A. The gradual institutionalisation of the French border police  
The police department in charge of border checks at ports of entry emerged within 
the French police’s intelligence department (Direction des Renseignements Généraux)3. 
This origin had an impact on staff training, the locations they were posted in, and the 
tasks and duties of this police service. One of the main effects of the border police’ 
development within the context of the intelligence service was the lack of material and 
legal means to ensure linear border control along national land borders. The PAF’s 
institutionalisation and gradual autonomisation went hand-in-hand with an increase of its 
material resources for border surveillance, not only at ports of entry, but also in a zone 
extending inward into national territory, along secondary roads.  
Until 1973, when the border police became independent from intelligence services, 
the only distinctive element setting border police officers apart from regular intelligence 
                                                
2 The border between France and Italy was opened on 1 April 1998. The ports of entry are situated 
along the border, in a mountainous region. The road runs along the sea and this passage goes through a 
zone where the Alps are not as high as in other areas. 
3 Thus, the French case is very distinct from that of Canada or the USA, where border police force 
creation has been linked to custom services. 
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service officers was their posting at the limits of national territory. Border police officers 
were part of intelligence service staff and worked in intelligence service facilities situated 
along the land borders and in airports (from 1953). From the 1960s on, the PAF sought to 
extend its reach beyond ports of entry, both along secondary roads and further into 
national territory, in a limited zone close to the border. To fulfil that objective, officers 
from the Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité (riot police)—a much more operational 
police force—were put under PAF supervision during the entire decade. In 1969, 
following the 1968 events4, these officers were permanently transferred to the PAF. This 
represented a turning point in the PAF’s professional identity. Until then, as members of 
the intelligence service, they had principally been entrusted with administrative tasks. A 
year after the PAF became autonomous; a new kind of brigade was created: the “Brigades 
frontalières mobiles” or BFM (Mobile Border Brigades). These brigades were to patrol 
the French land border between ports of entry. The zone covered by these brigades 
extended 60 km inward from the border itself5. This kind of brigade was also created in 
the Netherlands in 1976; in Germany, before the Schengen Agreement, the 
Bundesgrenzschutz carried out this type of border surveillance in a zone extending 30km 
into national territory (Groenendijk 2002). The 1970s are usually presented as a turning 
point for migration policies. Indeed, following the 1973 oil shock and resulting economic 
difficulties, most Western European countries closed their doors to labour immigration 
(Laurens 2009). Previously, migration controls were mainly carried out inside the 
territory, when migrants accessed the labour market. In other words, before the 1970s, the 
control of people’s mobility took place within French territory, via control of labour 
market access more than through checks at the border. Hence, the PAF’s autonomy and 
the creation of these special brigades along national borders coincided with the tightening 
of migration policies and migration control becoming more territorially embedded. 
However, the legal grounds for the intervention of these mobile border brigades 
were unclear. First, since their creation, there had been a gap between the legal 
justification and the objectives of the checks they carried out. In the case of border 
checks, entering the country constituted sufficient grounds to carry out identity checks on 
individuals in order to verify the legality of their administrative status. However, the 
BFM were actually conducting identity checks in reference to an “attempt to commit a 
crime or offense,”6 whereas they were supposed to be border checks. This lack of 
substantial juridical basis can be understood as a form of legal lawlessness (Brodeur 
2010) – which results in the gap between the formal legal framework and policy 
objectives. The second aspect of this ambiguous legal situation was linked to the French 
                                                
4 The “May 1968 events” (“événements de mai 1968”) is an expression referring to the student 
protest movement, demonstrations and massive general strikes of that year. 
5 This is the same distance covered by US border patrols. 
6 Article 78-2 of the Code de Procédure Pénale 
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policing system, in which two security agencies function in parallel: the National Police 
and the Gendarmerie. The Gendarmerie’s jurisdiction is limited to rural areas, and the 
National Police’s to urban areas. The “green” border7 is located in the Gendarmerie’s 
jurisdiction. The PAF’s jurisdiction is formally limited to border ports of entry. Yet the 
Brigades Frontalières Mobiles were created and their staffs have increased over the years, 
without any legal clarification of their intervention. Over the years the material and 
institutional resources of border police have been reinforced. This progressive change 
granted the possibility to exercise a more systematic control of individual’s mobility at 
the edge of the territory.  
 
B. Implementation of the Schengen Convention at the national level and 
creation of the Schengen Area 
This lack of legal ground for action has regularly been pointed out by the PAF 
hierarchy over the years. But paradoxically, it has been resolved thanks to the 
implementation of the Schengen Convention and the lifting of internal borders.  
At the European level, the building of an area of freedom of movement has been 
accompanied by “compensatory measures” defined in the Schengen Convention. These 
measures (mainly pertaining to police and judicial cooperation) were meant to 
counterbalance the “security deficit” that the lifting of internal borders was expected to 
produce (Bigo 1996). The same kind of rationale was used by political actors at the 
national level. Following the adoption of the Schengen Convention in 1990, French 
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua proposed a new measure to “compensate” for the lifting 
of internal borders inside the Schengen Area: the creation of a “Schengen zone”8 in 
which identity checks would be facilitated. A line was drawn inside French territory, 
20 km away from the border; inside this zone, police officers would be allowed to carry 
out checks without any justification. The legislative amendment essentially resulted in 
adding an exception to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which otherwise specifies 
precise cases in which identity checks may be conducted. The checks carried out inside 
this zone, on the other hand, are exceptional and legitimised by the border’s proximity9. 
The legitimate locus of control of individuals’ mobility has been extended from a “border 
line” to a “border zone”. But more importantly, since the “Schengen zone” law gives 
border police the legal basis necessary to carry out border controls outside border 
checkpoints, this measure legalised a practice that had been in use since the mid-1970s. 
Paradoxically, a measure meant to implement the principle of free movement of people 
                                                
7 The green border is the part of the land border situated between two ports of entry  
8 It was created by Law 93-992 of August 10th, 1993 and applies to every national French border 
inside the Schengen Area. 
9 The provision also applies to airports and international train stations. 
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within European territory actually reinforces the police’s legal capacity to control internal 
borders10.  
Since the enforcement of the Schengen Convention at internal borders, PAF 
officers have no longer been allowed to check individuals’ identities in ports of entry11. 
Indeed, most checkpoint structures there have been dismantled. All border identity 
checks are now done by members of the Brigades frontalières mobiles. BFM staff 
expanded very significantly in the mid-1980s, and the end of systematic border checks in 
ports of entry did not represent a total disruption. Indeed, in 1991, 44% of PAF staff 
posted to internal borders were members of one of these brigades. There is a form of 
continuity in the controls being held. The same brigades are holding identity checks in 
the same area, before and after the lifting of internal borders inside the Schengen Area. 
The definition of national borders as the legitimate locus of control of individuals’ 
mobility has not been challenged, even though systematic checks are not allowed 
anymore.  
Since the 1960s the PAF–or the police department under its supervision–has been 
performing border checks inside national territory, in a zone whose limits were first 
justified by the proximity of the border. Since the implementation of the Schengen 
Convention, identity checks have been facilitated in this Schengen zone, and not the 
entire French territory12. Control of people’s movement is still entrenched at the edges of 
the territory. Furthermore, the creation of the Schengen Area appears to be a way to deal 
with the double bind of open borders at the European level and migration control at the 
national level. Border checks have not been eliminated, but they have become invisible to 
the majority, producing an apparent framework of free movement of individuals. The ban 
                                                
10 This legal situation has not been affected until now, despite the adoption of an amendment 
concerning the conditions of the identity checks made at the internal borders of the Schengen Area in the 
law no 2011-267, of March 14th, 2011. It was an answer to the condemnation by the ECJ against France(C-
188/10 and C-189/10, Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli, judgment of 22 June 2010). It states that the border 
control “cannot be exercised for more than 6 consecutive hours in the same area, and cannot consist in 
automatic checks of every individuals presents or circulating in the above mentioned area”. However, at the 
time of my fieldwork, the checks at the internal border were already “non-automatic” checks. They were 
also supposed to be “mobile”, but in the reality, the PAF officers used to install the check at the same point 
on the road that goes across the border. So the real change might have been a diversification in the location 
of the border checks. But the checks being held in the train or at the train station have no reason to have 
been affected by this modification of legislation. 
11 The only change in the European legislation concerning internal borders regards the decision-
making procedure to re-introduce the border controls. I refer here to the adoption of the regulation (UE) 
1051/2013 (Regulation (EU) no 1051/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary  
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances) 
12 Nonetheless, the National Police force has showed a growing tendency to conduct identity checks 
connected to immigration control objectives, on French territory, far away from its borders. The two 
tendencies are concurrent. The latter checks are held in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which allows a prosecutor to define a geographical zone and time frame in which identity checks can be 
carried out without usual justifications. 
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on systematic border checks has led to the holding of supposedly “random” checks by 
mobile brigades. In reality these checks are not “random” at all; on the contrary, they are 
“targeted”. Consequently, in the Schengen Area the “hierarchizing and stratifying 
capacity of borders” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, p.7) only relies on border police 
officers’ work. It is a legal framework which transfers total responsibility to these actors 
for dealing with the double bind of free movement and immigration control at national 
borders. They manage this through targeting practices.  
 
2. Contemporary border control practices at the French-Italian border 
Targeting is a central dimension of border policing. Identity checks at the border 
imply the targeting of individuals and a very quick judgement from border police 
officers. As Heyman noted, during the first inspection, officers have a very short amount 
of time to build “an interpretative construct about the entrant, her rights, her relations 
with other people, and her past and future lines of action” (2004, p.310). An officer 
working near the Italian border declared “when we are checking the train it only stops for 
two minutes in the station. We have to target [people]. If the train is late, the company 
loses money”.13 This study will characterise targeting practices using the notion of 
“plausible stories”. Four components of them have been identified. The first involves 
immediately perceptible characteristics of the individuals crossing the border, such as 
assumed ethnicity, nationality, gender and/or age, clothes or luggage; the second, a 
modus operandi, a specific mode of transportation and way of crossing the border 
irregularly, such as hiring a smuggler or carrying forged documents. The third is the 
person’s itinerary: a point of departure, one or several stop-overs and a destination. The 
final component is the police’s legal and material ability to deport the migrants once 
identified. Each of the plausible stories used by PAF officers are characterized by these 
four dimensions. But only one of the four elements can suffice to associate an individual 
to a particular plausible story. Plausible stories are central to border policing—both the 
targeting and the decision of what kind of actions PAF officers are to take. 
 
Plausible stories are elaborated by PAF officers for both their clientele, i.e. the 
people they suspect to cross the border irregularly but also for people associated with 
“bona fide travelers” (Aas, 2011). Each individual crossing the border is associated with 
a plausible story. Each border can be characterized by a specific geographic and 
migratory context. This context is defined both by plausible stories associated with “bona 
fide travelers” and with the PAF’s clientele. These plausible stories are flexible and can 
                                                
13 PAF officer from the Pont Saint-Louis office, November 2008 
 12 
 
be modified. PAF officers target individual on the basis of already known plausible 
stories but also when they detect anomalies with the plausible stories of “bona fide 
travelers”. Once an anomaly is detected; it can lead to the elaboration of a new plausible 
story concerning the PAF’s clientele14. This notion takes into account the ability of 
border guards to modify and to elaborate new stories.  
  
In the Schengen Area, specific rules apply to identity checks. As checks are 
supposed to be random, targeting becomes much more obvious. Police officers then have 
to deal with how “bona fide travellers” regard their targeting practices. T. from the 
Menton PAF noted: “In the train, some people react. Once a lady asked me “and me why 
don’t you check me?”15 The officers’ justification for these practices is linked to the 
necessary rapidity of border checks aboard the train.  This practice is one of the officers’ 
responses to the “double bind” which characterises their work at the border. 
At the time of the fieldwork, the PAF officers at the France-Italy internal border 
seemed to be highly preoccupied by a specific kind of travellers: young men, sometimes 
teenagers, coming from Afghanistan, Iraq or Iran and heading to the United Kingdom, 
often carrying no luggage at all. The plausible story elaborated to describe these travellers 
gives some account about the way PAF officers manage to deal with the double bind 
specific to the internal borders of the Schengen Area. In October 2008 T., a police officer 
at the Nice PAF headquarters described the characteristics of this plausible story: “They 
leave their country to flee the war, their journey goes through Turkey, Greece, and they 
take the ferryboat and arrive in Italy, where they take a train to Ventimiglia [the Italian 
side of the border]. They do not ask for asylum, they want to go to Calais [the French 
coastline which is closest to the UK].”16 The plausible story also contains specific 
information about the modus operandi for crossing the French border: “The most 
practical way to enter French territory is by train. Their technique is: they arrive at 
Ventimiglia; they buy a ticket to Cannes, in Cannes they change to Paris. They don’t stop 
in Nice because they know the PAF is more present there.”17 PAF officers also consider 
the smugglers’ practices: “We know that they ride the train from Rome to Genoa and then 
from Genoa to Ventimiglia. We know that in Rome there are smugglers because the first 
tickets that they buy are paid for by credit card. But for the smuggler, there is no point in 
                                                
14 The fieldwork at the Nice airport provides a good example of this characterization of the border 
port-of-entry by plausible stories. As put by G. PAF officer at the Nice airport, “it is an atypical airport, 
apart from the residents, the travellers are filthy rich, and the smugglers fear that [irregular migrants] would 
be too obvious for the police. So the airport isn’t used a lot at the arrival.” Police officers are paying close 
attention to the “anomalies” with regards with this classical clientele.	  
15 PAF officer from the Pont Saint-Louis office, November 2008  
16 PAF officer from the Nice office, October 2008 
17 PAF officer at the Nice train station, November 2008 
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getting involved, in going all the way to Nice, it isn’t useful for the smugglers, they [the 
migrants] are on the right track!”18 
This plausible story takes European territory into account as a reference point, as 
the relevant territory for mobility. At the Menton PAF office, G. stated: “There are some 
“brakes”, in Turkey for example, when they arrive there, they can cross the border the 
same day or they might have to wait for three months, it is the same in Greece, then when 
they arrive in Italy, they go to those [detention] centres. Once they get there, [the 
authorities] release them little by little. We have no clue how many will arrive [at our 
border]. They arrive here with deportation orders. In the Italian detention centres they 
can be held for two weeks or three months.”19 This characteristic is specific to European 
internal borders and implies judgement of their European counterparts’ work at the 
external border. Very often, Greece is defined as a scapegoat. “The Turkey-Greece 
border is a sieve, and once they are in Greece, they are in the Schengen Area.”20 The 
recurrence of this statement has revealed a shared view among PAF officers about the 
work carried out by their Greek colleagues.  
The continuation of the migrants’ journey is also known to these police officers: 
“In Paris, there are a lot of Afghans in the park and in the Calais region also, it’s going 
to explode! There are like 4000 to 5000 people arriving per day, the NGOs can only 
handle shelter for 1100 persons a day, it’s a fight, these persons are hungry, and they are 
exhausted.”21 As this statement shows, the plausible story can even predict the future 
actions of the migrants checked at the France-Italy border. Plausible stories are 
elaborated through various interviews of people checked at the border, but also through 
the “traces” border police officers find: train tickets, documents delivered by the 
authorities in the states migrants have passed through. The officers’ representations have 
revealed a very rich and detailed understanding of the journey, motivations and 
objectives of irregular migrants. However, in practice, one single element corresponding 
to the plausible story elaborated by the PAF officers is sufficient for them to associate an 
individual to a group of targeted individuals.  
The last element of this plausible story involves border policing: the deportation 
capacity of the PAF officers. These migrants are specific in the sense that they cannot be 
deported. Individuals may only be deported to their country of origin or to the country 
they have passed through directly before they are stopped. PAF officers anticipate their 
ability to deport individuals, when targeting those they want to check, and sort them 
based on the possibility of deporting them. A PAF officer at the Nice train station stated: 
“We are sorting the persons we check according to the criteria defined by the procedure 
                                                
18 PAF officer in Nice, November 2009 
19 Officer from the Menton PAF, November 2008 
20 Officer from the Menton PAF, November 2008 
21 PAF officer in Nice, November 2008  
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towards the detention centre: we are filtering the persons carrying their identity 
documents, the ones carrying forged documents, the adults carrying train tickets”.22 If 
they find Italian train tickets on a person, they can deport him/her to Italy via the 
readmission23 procedure. If the PAF can prove the individual is carrying a forged 
document, a criminal investigation is opened, but they must determine his/her nationality. 
But once this is done, the PAF’s ability to deport the person depends on the procurement 
of a laissez-passer from the authorities of his/her country of origin. Its goodwill in 
delivering these passes depends on many variables (El Qadim 2014). One of the police 
chief’s key tasks is to maintain good working relationships with the local official 
representatives of these countries of origin24. Therefore, in assigning a plausible story to 
an individual they anticipate their ability to obtain a laissez-passer, as the same Nice train 
station officer put it, “Tunisians are easier to deport, we put them in the detention centre 
but they don’t stay long.”25 
Furthermore, the deportation procedure is subject to a time constraint. Detention 
cannot be extended beyond 45 days. So police officers have to identify the person’s 
country of origin and obtain a laissez-passer from it within this period. They prefer to 
avoid putting an individual in a detention centre if they already know it will not be 
possible to deport him/her. T. from the Nice PAF asserted that for Afghans, “there are no 
official representatives”. So individuals recognised as Afghans by the PAF are not put in 
detention centres26. The criterion used to decide whether the person will be placed in a 
detention centre or “readmitted” [deported to Italy] is the possibility of deporting them to 
their home country”.27 In this border region, the readmission procedure is used for a 
population the PAF cannot deport back to their home countries28. The rules constraining 
border police officers’ decisions when they wish to deport an individual lead them to 
maximise the efficiency of checks and arrests. They define criteria to make sure that they 
                                                
22 PAF officer at the Nice train station, November 2008  
23 The “readmission” procedure, in this case, is a deportation procedure between two member states 
of the Schengen Area. 
24 I overheard a very friendly telephone conversation between the head of the PAF and the 
Moroccan consulate in Nice. 
25 PAF officer at the Nice train station, November 2008 
26 There are some exceptions: the efficiency of PAF services is evaluated by their superior officers 
in terms of deportation statistics. The deportations carried out in the framework of the bilateral readmission 
agreement with Italy are not taken into account if the simplified procedure is used. So when a particular 
service’s total figure for deportation cases is low, it might send individuals to detention centres even if it 
already knows it will be unable to deport them to their home countries. The migrants will be deported to 
Italy via the regular readmission procedure that applies to the entire territory of France, and implies 
detention. 
27 G., a PAF officer from the Menton office, November 2008; he had been working in this service 
since the early 1990s.  
28 At the time fieldwork was carried out, no deportations to Iraq or Afghanistan were possible 
because of the conflict situations there.  
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will be able to deport the individuals they arrest to their country of origin or to the last 
country they passed through before France (in this case, Italy). 
This plausible story is one among the various plausible stories used by the PAF 
officers at the French-Italian border. But this specific plausible story particularly 
illustrates the ambiguity of the Schengen internal borders. The control of these migrants 
is a clear example of the fact that PAF officers have to face European and French stakes 
at the same time. It results from the interaction between these migrants crossing European 
territory and the PAF officers enacting national sovereignty at the geographical borders. 
The rather exceptional nature of the trajectories of these migrants only reveals the 
specificity of this border, which is one of the many hazards of their journey. Deportation 
practices reveal the tensions PAF officers must deal with on a daily basis.  
 
3. Deportation practices at the France-Italy border 
A. Continuity of the deportation practices at the internal border 
Before the Schengen Convention entered into force, when the Italy-France border 
was an external border, if an individual checked at a port of entry lacked the proper 
documents to enter the territory, he/she was simply denied access to French territory. 
This “denial of admission” procedure was administrative. If the check occurred at the 
“green” border, the French border police would arrest and deport the person, handing 
him/her over to their Italian counterparts. The exchange was done at the main border 
crossing point: the Pont Saint-Louis port of entry. After the Schengen Convention was 
implemented, ports of entry were closed. The denial of admission procedure was 
abolished. If a person is arrested in the Schengen zone, the deportation procedure is now 
the same as elsewhere in French territory. First the individual is taken into custody, then 
placed in a detention centre (a Centre de Rétention Administrative – CRA) via a decision 
of the Préfet, the local representative of the executive authorities.  
However, during the Schengen Convention’s implementation phase, most member 
states signed cross-border bilateral agreements with each other, including measures for 
police co-operation and readmission agreements. As regards our case study, these 
readmission agreements set out the conditions for the expulsion of third-country nationals 
residing legally in Italy but not in France, and for third-country nationals who entered EU 
territory irregularly and passed through Italy. Obviously these measures are reciprocal, 
and readmission agreements apply to the whole territory. However, in the bordering 
département a specific, simplified procedure applies: police officers do not need the 
Préfet’s authorisation to implement the agreement. They return the individuals arrested to 
the Italian police on the other side of the border only with the permission of the latter’s. 
Expulsions take place at Pont Saint-Louis, the same point where they used to be carried 
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out before the implementation of the Schengen Convention. Thus, there is a form of 
continuity of deportation practices: they still involve the same kind of actors and the same 
venue. Similarly to checks in the border zone, the implementation of the Schengen 
Convention has not radically altered the border police’s practices at the internal border, 
despite the elimination of systematic checks at ports of entry. 
 
B. Facing the uselessness of controls 
The striking point about this procedure is its apparent uselessness for all the 
protagonists involved. An episode observed during my fieldwork was very representative 
of both police officers’ and migrants’ perceptions of this procedure.  
 
I was interviewing two PAF officers at the former port of entry of Pont St-Louis. It 
is situated on the old mountain road between Menton and Ventimiglia. Several years 
earlier, a new highway skirting the mountain had been constructed; the last active port of 
entry had been on that highway. There was barely any traffic on the old mountain road, 
on the other hand, which was almost deserted. The identification department of the 
Menton PAF had been posted at the former port of entry of Pont Saint Louis, but no 
controls were held on this road. The national border was just a few metres higher up the 
road. 
During the interview, we caught sight of a person walking down, partly hidden by 
the parked cars along the road. The officers came out on the road to bar his way. One of 
them shouted at him: “No, you don’t go this way, go back to Italy!” The young man came 
over to the middle of the road, smiling at the police officers, trying to negotiate. Other 
police officers came out of the building, shouting the same order at him. He finally went 
back up the road, very peacefully. The PAF officer told me he would manage to cross the 
border anyway, either later on by this same road, or else by the other road, by sea or by 
train. The man trying to cross the border did not seem frightened by the police in any 
way; however, he eventually did follow their orders. In fact, police officers actually 
carried out an illegal non-admission procedure on him on the basis of his presumed 
nationality, which was never checked—and at an internal border29.  
 
The nature of this border is constantly being negotiated. Its existence was denied 
by the migrant’s gesture in the case above. In contrast, police officers assert its continued 
existence as a national border, though they have no legal basis for this claim in such cases 
                                                
29 If my presence influenced the police officers’ actions, I suppose they preferred to reaffirm the 
national border than to respect the law. 
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as this. Their main concern in the case above was reaffirmation of the national border, 
even if it meant implementing an illegal order in my presence. This insistence on 
prohibiting this man’s crossing appeared to be a symbolic act. A police officer from the 
Nice region admitted: “Readmission doesn’t work, it’s useless, Italian border police 
officers only tackle the administrative tasks, and then they release the migrant.” 30 
 
In fact, one of the reasons why the readmission procedure at the Menton-
Ventimiglia border reinforces this uselessness impression is that readmission appears to 
be absolutely contrary to Italian authorities’ interests. In cases when French border police 
cannot deport migrants to their home countries, neither can the Italian state police. 
Furthermore, there are many more French requests for readmission to Italy than the 
reverse; the ratio is “1 to 10”31. Therefore, implementation of the readmission procedure 
is difficult. As one police officer confirmed, talking about his Italian counterparts: 
“That’s for sure, they’re not delighted! We have to explain it to them.” 32 
Italian state police forces are supposed to come and search migrants being 
readmitted, but as a PAF officer from Menton told me: “They don’t do it every time. […] 
This morning for example, we stopped 35 Afghans on the train. They didn’t come to take 
them, so we turned them back 25 metres away: “RLT : raccompagnement aux limites du 
territoire” [escorted back to the limits of French territory]” 33. Even when Italian police 
come to detain the migrants, they usually release them a few kilometres away34. One of 
the officers working at the co-operation centre stated: “In reality we are keeping score”35. 
Police officers tend to develop a very fatalistic discourse. G. from the Menton PAF 
service told me: “We can do what we want, as long as the Turkey-Greece border is not 
secure… When the person decides to leave, it’s already too late. They don’t want to go 
back, they sell everything, they have nothing left. You can set the double objective, they 
will still be there.”36. T. added: “The external borders are porous, once they get onto 
Schengen territory it’s over! (repeated three times) in particular with the nationalities we 
cannot deport, we know that sooner or later, these persons will get to where they want to 
go.”37 
                                                
30 PAF officer at the Nice office, October 2008. 
31 PAF officer from Menton, November 2008 
32 PAF officer from the Police and Customs Cooperation Centre, March 2009. The PCCC is situated 
in the former Italian port of entry at the Pont Saint-Louis; it is used (among other functions) for the 
exchange of migrants in the framework of the readmission procedure. 
33 PAF officer from Menton, November 2008 
34 One reason for this is that the closest detention centre is in Rome, very far from the border in 
Rome. 
35 PAF officer from the Police and Customs Cooperation Centre, March 2009  
36 Officer from the Menton PAF, November 2008 




However, a change in the focus of observation could provide some explanation for 
this procedure. The final aim seems to be postponing the arrival of “undesirable” 
migrants in the northern area of France. This role is acknowledged by some officers: “In 
Menton, we can’t do much; we gather information on irregulars, so it’s more like a 
slowing-down of the flow.”38. Actually, the “migratory” situation did not evolve much 
since 2010. The Vintimiglia/Menton border is still on the trajectory of migrants reaching 
the European shores and heading towards UK. In 2011, the arrival of numerous Tunisian 
citizens after the revolution at the Vintimiglia/Menton border led to a political crisis 
between the two Member states. The politicization of this issue at the domestic and 
European level had several consequences. The French government reintroduced 
temporarily the border checks in Menton in April. At the European level, France and Italy 
asked for a revision of the Schengen Treaty which ended with the adoption of the 
1051/2013 Regulation. Today, the tragic situation of Syria has had consequences on the 
origin of the migrants but the trajectory and the problematic (no possibility to deport the 
irregular migrants) remains the same. Between January and November 2014, 22 000 
migrants have crossed the Italy-France border. The question has been once again under 
the attention of the media as the Interior ministry visited the PAF services in Menton. The 
staffs of the PAF have been reinforced on this occasion39. This situation was clearly put 
by one of the PAF officers I interviewed: 
“Now, most of the immigration flux comes from Iraq and Afghanistan. We are 
barometer of geopolitics, when it goes wrong somewhere, it comes here! There are also 
climate refugees from the Indian subcontinent; we are the European barometer for the 
problems in the world. A lot of foreigners cross in Ventimiglia, a lot of things happen in 
Ventimiglia at the train station and in the area”40. The current situation of this border 
confirms the assertion of this PAF officer. 
The representations linked to border controls are often described as a “masculinist 
and chivalrous logic” which identifies the nation as a “proverbial ‘damsel in distress’ and 
the border as a thin blue line in need of constant vigilance against risky foreigners” (Pratt 
and Thompson 2008, p.622). In the case of internal borders, this is a distinct form of 
management of the population moving through and within the territory. The border is not 
perceived as a real “fortress”, but rather as an obstacle on these migrants’ very long road. 
A constant dialectic of affirmation and challenging of the border can be observed among 
migrants and police officers themselves. Furthermore, this population is not associated 
                                                
38 PAF officer at the Nice office, October 2008 
39 « Plus de 22 000 personnes arrêtées du côté de Menton » Fabien Binacchi, 20 Minutes, 12 
novembre 2014 
40 Officer from the Menton PAF, November 2008 
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with criminality or terrorism, but with misery. Police officers are not faced with an influx 
of aggressive and criminal foreigners, but an unstoppable flow of desperate individuals. 
The fatalistic discourse and the apparent uselessness of their daily work can be 
interpreted as the effect of the distance between the traditional role they embody at 
external borders and their representations of it, on the one hand, and their actual role at 
the France-Italy border, on the other.  
 
Conclusion  
This paper explores the resilient materiality of controls over individuals’ mobility 
and how these controls are anchored to the edges of the national territory. This analysis is 
based on observation at borders where this control is supposed to have vanished: 
Schengen Area internal borders. Historical assessment of the border police’s 
organisation, representations and practices throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century shows that the linearity of border checks has been a central stake in their 
institutionalisation. However, the legal and material resources available to border police 
officers have long been insufficient. Not until the mid-1970s did border areas became 
(more or less) legitimate zones in which to control individuals’ mobility. The Schengen 
Convention and the lifting of internal borders within the EU have had paradoxical effects 
on border policing and the nature of borders. The state still exercises its power to manage 
individuals’ mobility in a specific legitimate way inside the “Schengen zone” at internal 
borders. Border checks do not take place in ports of entry on the borders any more, but 
national territorial delimitation has not lost all significance. Controls at national borders 
inside the Schengen Area have not disappeared; the modality of state control over 
individuals’ mobility has been redefined. And this redefinition has to do with the specific 
process of European integration. These borders are at the core of the interaction between 
the construction of a new, European political centre, and the affirmation of an old one, 
the national political centre. Border police officers are in charge of dealing with the 
tension, or double bind of sorts, emerging from this interaction. 
In the 1990s, the national legislative implementation of the Schengen Convention 
led to the creation of the Schengen Area; in France, this transferred the responsibility of 
dealing with the tension between the European principle of free movement and national 
migration control policy, to PAF officers. One of the practices used by border police to 
deal with this tension is targeting. The precise analysis of the content of plausible stories 
used by border police officers gives an account of the nature of the hierarchisation 
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) process that takes place at the border. But this 
hierarchisation is highly linked to the kind of agency that PAF officers enjoy over the 
“crimmigrants”’ bodies.  
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Furthermore, PAF officers develop a very precise representation of the migrants’ 
itineraries and are very aware of the weak impact of their own work on migrants’ 
journeys. Thus, border policing practices are both very locally embedded, and associated 
with a much larger perspective which overtakes this local nature.   
National borders are still a setting in which the state manages individuals’ mobility. 
This management can take the form of very tight and systematic checks, or of more 
targeted checks; in any case, borders are used as a legitimate location in which to regulate 
individuals’ mobility.  
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